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abstract
The paper examines the problem of explicit description of a social welfare order over infinite utility
streams, which respects anonymity and weak Pareto axioms. It provides a complete characterization of
the domains of one period utilities, for which it is possible to explicitly describe a weak Paretian social
welfare order satisfying the anonymity axiom. For domains containing any set of order type similar to the
set of positive and negative integers, every equitable social welfare order satisfying the weak Pareto axiom
is non-constructive. The paper resolves a conjecture by Fleurbaey and Michel (2003) that there exists no
explicit (that is, avoiding the axiom of choice or similar contrivances) description of an ordering which
satisfies weak Pareto and indifference to finite permutations. It also provides an interesting connection
between the existence of social welfare function and the constructive nature of social welfare order by
showing that the domain restrictions for the two are identical.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
In this paper, we are concerned with the problem of finding
an explicit description of a Paretian social welfare order, which
satisfies equal treatment of all generations.
Early contributions to the related literature were concerned
with the idea of a preference for advancing the timing of future
consumption (which came to be known as impatience). The
first modern axiomatic treatment of the notion of impatience is
contained in Koopmans (1960). He came up with a minimal set
of axioms, namely, continuity, sensitivity, non-complementarity
and stationarity, which any non-trivial social welfare function
should satisfy and showed that for such a social welfare function,
‘‘impatience1 prevails at least in certain areas of the program
space’’ Koopmans (1960, p. 288).
Subsequent research generalized this result in two directions.
Koopmans et al. (1964), generalized the impatience criterion to a
property called weak time perspective2 and showed the existence of
weak time perspective from which the earlier result on impatience
can be obtained and extended to a larger part of the program space.
Other authors, relaxed some of the axioms of Koopmans (1960)

E-mail address: rsd28@cornell.edu.
1 Koopmans defines impatience as ‘‘if in any given year the consumption of a
bundle x of commodities is preferred over that of a bundle x′ , the consumption in
two successive years of x, x′ , in that order, is preferred to the consumption of x′ , x’’.
2 They described it as ‘‘As the timing difference between any two programs
is made to recede into a more distant future, the utility difference between the
programs either remains the same or diminishes’’.
0304-4068/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.05.003

to show that the existence of impatience (including its variations)
persists even in a weaker environment.
In order to review these contributions, we use the framework
that has become standard in this literature. We consider the
problem of defining social welfare orders on the set X of infinite
utility streams, where this set takes the form of X = Y N , with Y
denoting a non-empty set of real numbers and N the set of natural
numbers.
It is generally agreed in the literature that any social preference
should satisfy the following two axioms. The first axiom is
‘‘equal treatment’’ of all generations (present and future), which
is formalized in the form of an Anonymity Axiom3 on social
preferences. It requires that society should be indifferent between
two streams of well-being, if one is obtained from the other by
interchanging the levels of well-being of any two generations.
The other axiom is the Pareto Axiom. Society should consider one
stream of well-being to be superior to another if at least one
generation is better off and no generation is worse off in the former
compared to the latter.
With respect to weakening the Pareto axiom, we can justifiably
take the position that the so-called Weak Pareto Axiom is more
compelling than the Pareto axiom; it requires that society should
consider one stream of well-being to be superior to another if every
generation is better off in the former compared to the latter. In
the context of evaluating infinite utility streams, it is debatable
whether in comparing two utility streams, society is always better

3 This definition applies to utility streams which can be obtained from any utility
stream by carrying out finitely many permutations. It does not include the more
general case of utility streams which can be obtained by carrying out infinitely many
permutations.
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off if one generation is (or a finite number of generations are) better
off and all other generations are unaffected, so the standard Pareto
axiom might not be self-evident.
In a seminal contribution, Diamond (1965) showed that there
does not exist any continuous social welfare order satisfying the
equal treatment and Pareto axioms (where continuity is defined
with respect to sup metric) when Y is the closed interval [0, 1]. A
social welfare order satisfying the Pareto axiom and the continuity
requirement is representable by a social welfare function which is
continuous in the sup metric, when Y is the closed interval [0, 1].
Therefore, Diamond’s result also implies that there does not exist
any social welfare function satisfying Pareto and equal treatment
axioms, which is continuous in the sup metric when Y is the closed
interval [0, 1].
Basu and Mitra (2003) showed that this last statement can be
refined as follows: there does not exist any social welfare function
satisfying the Anonymity and Pareto axioms, when Y contains at
least two distinct elements. Another way of stating this is that there
does not exist any representable social welfare order satisfying
the anonymity and Pareto axioms, when Y contains at least two
distinct elements.
If one requires neither continuity of the social welfare order
nor its representability, it is possible to show the existence of a
social welfare order satisfying the anonymity and Pareto axioms.
Svensson (1980) established this important result, using Szpilrajn
(1930) Lemma, assuming Y to be the closed interval [0, 1].
These two results clearly bring out the dividing line between the
social welfare function and the social welfare order as they imply
the non-existence of an equitable Paretian social welfare function
on any non-trivial domain as against the existence of an equitable
Paretian social welfare order for all domains. Thus ethical Paretian
social welfare order could turn out to be a useful policy instrument,
if it is possible to construct one explicitly.
However, if the use of the Axiom of Choice is necessary in the
proof of the existence result, then social welfare orders would
be non-constructive objects. While seeking an explicit description
of an equitable Paretian social welfare order, one may, following
the approach of Svensson (1980), consider binary relations which
are quasi-orders4 satisfying the anonymity and Pareto axioms, for
possible extension into an order. However, there seems to be a
conflict between transitivity and completeness in this exercise.
Fleurbaey and Michel (2003) considered two approaches
dealing with this problem: (i) extend an egalitarian Paretian
quasi-order to an order, and (ii) extend a complete and quasitransitive5 binary relation to an equitable Paretian order. They
observed the critical role of the existence of a free ultrafilter 6 in
extending these binary relations to an order. This difficulty led
them to make a conjecture that there exists no explicit (that is,
avoiding the axiom of choice or similar contrivances) description of
an ordering which satisfies weak Pareto and indifference to finite
permutations.
Before we explain the contribution of this paper, we describe
the existing literature on this subject. Zame (2007) shows that the
existence of a social welfare order satisfying the anonymity and
weak Pareto axioms entails the existence of a non-measurable set
which is a non-constructive object, for the domain Y = [0, 1].
Also for domain Y = {0, 1}, Lauwers (2010) shows that a quasiorder in the set of infinite utility streams satisfying anonymity and

4 A binary relation is a quasi-order if it is reflexive and transitive. A quasi-order
is an order if it is complete.
5 A binary relation is quasi-transitive if for all x, y, z, x ≻ y and y ≻ z imply x ≻ z.

6 A brief overview of the notions of a filter, an ultrafilter and a free ultrafilter can
be found in Fleurbaey and Michel (2003, p. 790–791). A free ultrafilter is a nonconstructive concept. See Halpern (1964).
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intermediate Pareto (which assumes monotonicity in addition to
infinite Pareto7 ) is either incomplete or contains a non-Ramsey set
which is again a non-constructive object.
Notice that Zame (2007) and Lauwers (2010) have taken
different domains and also different versions of Pareto axiom to
prove their results. Our approach, in contrast, is to consider the
domain Y itself to be a variable and examine the restrictions on
Y for the Fleurbaey–Michel conjecture to hold.
We characterize the restrictions on domain Y for which any
social welfare order, satisfying anonymity and weak Pareto axioms,
is non-constructive. Using the order properties of subsets of the
real line, we show that if the domain Y contains a subset of order
type similar to the set of positive and negative integers,8 it is not
possible to describe any equitable social welfare order satisfying
the weak Pareto axiom. We also explicitly construct a social
welfare order for all domains which do not contain any subset of
order type similar to the set of positive and negative integers.
This result leads to a complete resolution of the Fleurbaey–Michel conjecture. There exist non-trivial subsets of [0, 1]
for which a social welfare order can be written explicitly. It refines Zame’s result which holds for the interval [0, 1] but has now
been shown to not hold for all subsets of [0, 1]. Also, it shows how
the domain, for which a social welfare order can be explicitly constructed, expands when we weaken the intermediate Pareto axiom
used by Lauwers to the weak Pareto axiom.
The second contribution of this paper is as follows. We are
now in a position to consider following relationship between the
existence of a social welfare function and the constructive nature
of social welfare order combining the results in the literature with
those established here.
For Y = {0, 1}, Basu and Mitra (2003) show that there does
not exist any social welfare function on X = Y N which satisfies
the anonymity and Pareto axioms. Further Crespo et al. (2009) extend this result to the case where Pareto axiom is weakened to infinite Pareto axiom. Using the results of Zame (2007, p. 200) and
Lauwers (2010, p. 37), it is clear that the domain restrictions for
the existence of a social welfare function and the constructive nature of social welfare order satisfying Pareto or infinite Pareto and
anonymity axioms, are identical. This lets us explore the possibility
of a similar result holding in cases where we apply the weak Pareto
and anonymity axioms.
For Y being of order type µ, Dubey and Mitra (2011) show that
there exists no social welfare function on X = Y N which satisfies
the anonymity and weak Pareto axioms. This domain coincides
with the set Y for which there does not exist an explicit description
of a social welfare order as shown in Theorem 1.
We are thus led to the result that domain restrictions are
identical for (i) non-existence of equitable weak Paretian social
welfare function, and (ii) non-constructive nature of equitable
weak Paretian social welfare order. Thus for any domain Y , either
there exists an equitable Paretian social welfare function or no
equitable Paretian social welfare order is constructive. In cases
where a social welfare function exists, it has a simple form – a linear
combination of inf and sup of the sequence of one period utilities.
2. Basic framework
Let R be the set of real numbers, N the set of positive integers,
Q the set of rational numbers and I the set of positive and negative
integers. Suppose Y ⊂ R is the set of all possible utilities that any

7 Infinite Pareto axiom postulates sensitivity in each set of infinitely many
elements of the utility streams.
8 Such ordered sets have been termed as sets of order type µ in Dubey and Mitra
(2011). Please refer to Section 2 for a precise definition.
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generation can achieve. Then X = Y N is the set of all possible utility
streams.
If x ≡ ⟨xn ⟩ ∈ X , then ⟨xn ⟩ = (x1 , x2 , . . .), where for all n ∈ N,
xn ∈ Y represents the amount of utility that the generation of
period n earns. For all y, z ∈ X , we write y ⩾ z if yn ⩾ zn , for
all n ∈ N; y > z if y ⩾ z and y ̸= z; and y ≫ z if yn > zn for all
n ∈ N.
If Y has only one element, then X is a singleton, and the problem
of ranking or evaluating infinite utility streams is trivial. Thus,
without further mention, the set Y will always be assumed to have
at least two distinct elements.
A social welfare order (SWO) is a binary relation < on X which
is complete and transitive. We write x ∼ y if both x < y and y < x
hold; and x ≻ y when x < y and y ̸< x hold. A social welfare
function (SWF) is a mapping, W : X → R.
2.1. Definitions
2.1.1. Pareto and anonymity axioms
The first axiom is the weak Pareto axiom; this is a version of
the Pareto9 axiom that has been widely used in the literature, and
could possibly be even more compelling than the standard Pareto
axiom.
Weak Pareto axiom: For all x, y ∈ X , if x ≫ y, then x ≻ y.
The next axiom is the one that captures the notion of ‘‘intergenerational equity’’. We call it the ‘‘anonymity axiom’’.
Anonymity axiom: For all x, y ∈ X , if there exist i, j ∈ N such
that xi = yj and xj = yi , and for every k ∈ N \ {i, j}, xk = yk , then
x ∼ y.10
2.1.2. Non-constructive weak Paretian egalitarian SWO
First we define the non-Ramsey set. Let T be an infinite set and
let n be a positive integer. Let T (n) ≡ [T ]n be the collection of all
the subsets of T with exactly n elements. Ramsey (1928) showed
that for each subset S of T (n), there exists
an infinite set T̄ ⊂ T
such that either T¯ (n) ≡ [T̄ ]n ⊂ S or T¯ (n) S = ∅.
Ramsey Theorem fails when n is replaced by countable infinity.
There exists a subset U of T ≡ [T ]∞ such that for each infinite
subset T̄ of T , the class T¯ ≡ [T̄ ]∞ intersects both U as well as its
complement T \ U . Such a set U is said to be a non-Ramsey set.
Observe that non-Ramsey set is a non-constructive object, a fact
established in Mathias (1977).
If the existence of a non-constructive mathematical object is
a necessary condition for the existence of a weak Paretian SWO
satisfying the anonymity axiom, then we say that such a SWO is
non-constructive.
2.1.3. Domain types
We recall a few concepts from the mathematical literature
dealing with types of spaces, which are strictly ordered by a binary
relation.
We will say that the set A is strictly ordered by a binary relation R
if R is connected (if a, a′ ∈ A and a ̸= a′ , then either aR a′ or a′ R a
holds), transitive (if a, a′ , a′′ ∈ A and aR a′ and a′ R a′′ hold, then
aR a′′ holds) and irreflexive (aR a holds for no a ∈ A). In this case,
the strictly ordered set will be denoted by A(R ). For example, the
set N is strictly ordered by the binary relation < (where < denotes
the usual ‘‘less than’’ relation on the reals).

We will say that a strictly ordered set A′ (R ′ ) is similar to
the strictly ordered set A(R ) if there is a one-to-one function f
mapping A onto A′ , such that:
a1 , a2 ∈ A

and a1 R a2 ⇒ f (a1 )R ′ f (a2 ).

We now specialize to strictly ordered subsets of the reals. With
Y a non-empty subset of R, let us define some order types as follows.
We will say that the strictly ordered set Y (<) is:
(i) of order type ω if Y (<) is similar to N(<);
(ii) of order type σ if Y (<) is similar to I(<);
(iii) of order type µ if Y contains a non-empty subset Y ′ , such that
the strictly ordered set Y ′ (<) is of order type σ .
The characterization of these types of strictly ordered sets is
facilitated by the concepts of a cut, a first element and a last
element of a strictly ordered set.
Given a strictly ordered set Y (<), let us define a cut [Y1 , Y2 ] of
Y (<) as a partition of Y into two non-empty sets Y1 and Y2 (that is,
Y1 and Y2 are non-empty, Y1 ∪ Y2 = Y and Y1 ∩ Y2 = ∅), such that
for each y1 ∈ Y1 and each y2 ∈ Y2 , we have y1 < y2 .
An element y0 ∈ Y is called a first element of Y (<) if y < y0
holds for no y ∈ Y . An element y0 ∈ Y is called a last elementof
Y (<) if y0 < y holds for no y ∈ Y .
The following result can be found in Sierpinski (1965, p. 210).
Proposition. A strictly ordered set Y (<) is of order type σ if and only
if the following two conditions hold:
(i) Y has neither a first element nor a last element.
(ii) For every cut [Y1 , Y2 ] of Y , the set Y1 has a last element and the
set Y2 has a first element.
3. Fleurbaey–Michel conjecture
We analyze the conjecture in the following steps. In Lemma 1,
we show that the existence of any SWO satisfying anonymity and
weak Pareto axioms for infinite utility streams in X ≡ IN implies
existence of a non-Ramsey set using technique similar to that used
in Lauwers (2010).
In order to show that the result holds for all ordered sets of order
type µ, we prove an invariance result in Lemma 2 for subsets Y of
R, for which there exists monotone one-to-one map from I onto
some subset Y ′ of Y . The general claim for all sets of order type µ
is proved in Theorem 1.
3.1. Weak Pareto and anonymity imply non-Ramsey set
First we construct a pair of utility streams consisting of integers
from any arbitrary infinite subset of natural numbers. Let N ≡
{n1 , n2 , . . .} be an infinite subset of N such that nk < nk+1 for all
k ∈ N. Given N, we construct an infinite utility stream x(N ) ≡ ⟨xn ⟩
as follows.
(i) Using N, we create the following subsets of N,
N = {n1 , n1 + 1, . . . , n2 − 1, n3 , n3 + 1, . . . , n4 − 1, . . .},
and
N = N \ N.
Note that both N and N are infinite subsets of N.
(ii) We rewrite the above two subsets N, N as under,

9 The standard Pareto axiom is, Pareto axiom: For all x, y ∈ X , if x > y, then
x ≻ y. It is also referred to as strong Pareto axiom in the literature.
10 In informal discussions throughout the paper, the terms ‘‘equity’’ and
‘‘anonymity’’ are used interchangeably.

N ≡ {m1 , m2 , . . .},

m1 < m2 < · · · ,

and
N ≡ {l1 , l2 , . . .},

l1 < l2 < · · · .
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3.3. SWO for Y of order type µ satisfying weak Pareto and anonymity
is non-constructive.

Note that,
m1 = n1 , . . . , mn2 −1 = n2 − 1,

mn2 = n3 , . . . ;

and
l1 = 1, . . . , ln1 −1 = n1 − 1,
Observe also that N̄



We can now state the non-constructive SWO result for general
domains of order type µ.

ln1 = n2 , . . . .

N = N and N̄



N = ∅.

(iii) The sequence ⟨xn ⟩ is defined as follows.


xn =

r

−s

if n = mr for some r ∈ N,
if n = ls for some s ∈ N.
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(1)

We also construct sequence y(N ) ≡ ⟨yn ⟩ using the subset N \ n1 in
place of subset N, in identical fashion.
Observe that each of the two sequences contains the entire set
of integers, the positive integers occurring in increasing order and
the negative integers occurring in decreasing order.
Example 1. Let N = {2, 4, 6, . . .}. Then,
N = {2, 3, 6, 7, . . .},
and
N = {1, 4, 5, 8, . . .}
would imply that x(N ) = {−1, 1, 2, −2, −3, 3, 4, . . .}.
Corresponding sequence y would be y(N ) = {−1, −2, −3, 1,
2, −4, −5, . . .}.
For the sequences x, y constructed as above, we state the
following two claims (proofs are given in the Appendix) which
would be used in the proof of Lemma 1.
Claim 1. For x, y, if xn ⩾ yn for all n ∈ N and xn > 0 > yn for
infinitely many n ∈ N, then there exists a finite permutation ⟨xn (π )⟩
of ⟨xn ⟩ such that x(π ) ≫ y.
Claim 2. For x, y, if xn < 0 < yn for a finite number of n, xn >
0 > yn for an infinite number of n, and xn , yn have same sign for all
the remaining n, then there exists a finite permutation ⟨xn (π )⟩ of ⟨xn ⟩
such that x(π ) ≫ y.
Next we present Lemma 1 (Proof in Appendix) showing that
the existence of non-Ramsey set is necessary for the existence of
egalitarian weak Paretian SWO for X ≡ IN .
Lemma 1. The existence of a social welfare order satisfying weak
Pareto and anonymity axioms for all x, y ∈ X entails the existence
of a non-Ramsey set.
Since non-Ramsey set is a non-constructive object, Lemma 1
shows that Fleurbaey–Michel conjecture is true for the domain
Y = I.
3.2. An invariance result
In this subsection, we will see that the result in Lemma 1
actually holds for all non-empty domains Y ⊂ R of order type µ
because of an invariance result, which states that any possibility
result is invariant with respect to monotone transformations of the
domain.
Lemma 2. Let Y be a non-empty subset of R, X ≡ Y N , and let
there exist a social welfare order, <X , satisfying the weak Pareto and
anonymity axioms. Suppose f is a monotone (increasing or decreasing)
function from Ỹ to Y , where Ỹ is a non-empty subset of R. Then,
there exists a social welfare order, <X̃ , satisfying the weak Pareto and
anonymity axioms, for X̃ = Ỹ N .
Proof. It is easy to prove this proposition by adapting the
technique of the proof of Proposition 2 in Dubey and Mitra
(2011). 

Theorem 1. Let Y be a non-empty subset of R such that Y (<) is of
order type µ. Then, the existence of a weak Paretian social welfare
order for X = Y N , satisfying anonymity axiom implies existence of a
non-Ramsey set.
Proof. Since Y (<) is of order type µ, Y contains a non-empty
subset Y ′ such that Y ′ (<) is of order type σ . That is, there is a oneto-one mapping, g, from I onto Y ′ such that:
a1 , a2 ∈ I and

a1 < a2 ⇒ g (a1 ) < g (a2 ).

Thus, g is an increasing function from I to Y ′ . Using Lemma 2,
there exists a SWO on X̃ satisfying the weak Pareto and anonymity
axioms, where X̃ = IN . But then by Lemma 1, the existence of
a SWO on X̃ satisfying the weak Pareto and anonymity axioms,
where X̃ = IN , implies existence of a non-Ramsey set. 
4. Equivalence of SWF and constructible SWO
In this section, first we use the possibility result in Dubey and
Mitra (2011) on the existence of an equitable SWF satisfying weak
Pareto axiom to show that it is possible to construct an equitable
SWO satisfying weak Pareto axiom for domains which are not of
order type µ.
4.1. Example of SWO
Let Ŷ be a non-empty subset of [0, 1], with X̂ ≡ Ŷ N and suppose
that Ŷ (<) is not of order type µ. Then the function W (·), defined
below, from Proposition 1 in Dubey and Mitra (2011), satisfies both
weak Pareto and anonymity axioms.
Example 2. For all x ∈ X̂ , consider the SWF,
W (x) = θ inf{xn }n∈N + (1 − θ ) sup{xn }n∈N ,

(2)

where θ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter.
Using this W (·), we can describe following SWO <, for all
x, y ∈ X̂ ,
x < y if and only if W (x) ⩾ W (y) .
Observe that the SWO satisfies weak Pareto and anonymity axioms
since W (·) does.
The possibility result in Example 2 is stated for domains Ŷ ⊂
[0, 1]. In Proposition 3 in Dubey and Mitra (2011), the existence
of equitable weak Paretian SWF for Y ⊂ R, which are not of
order type µ, has been proved using an invariance result similar
to Lemma 2. It is possible to construct a SWO for domains Y ⊂ R,
provided they are not of order type µ, by using the SWF mentioned
above. The possibility result for general domain is stated as follows.
Lemma 3. Let Y be a non-empty subset of R and let X ≡ Y N . There
exists an explicit description of social welfare order, <, satisfying the
weak Pareto and anonymity axioms if Y (<) is not of order type µ.
Proof. In Proposition 3 in Dubey and Mitra (2011), existence of
an SWF W (·) satisfying weak Pareto and anonymity has been
established by construction. Hence, the SWO,
x < y if and only if W (x) ⩾ W (y) ,
also satisfies weak Pareto and anonymity axioms.
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Using Lemma 3 and Theorem 1, we are in a position to
completely characterize the domain for which SWO can be
explicitly written down. It coincides with the domain for which
there exists a weak Paretian SWF satisfying anonymity axiom.
Theorem 2. Let Y be a non-empty subset of R and X = Y N . The
following two statements are equivalent.
(a) There does not exist a weak Paretian social welfare function W :
X → R satisfying anonymity axiom.
(b) For all x, y ∈ X , existence of a weak Paretian social welfare order
satisfying anonymity axiom implies existence of a non-Ramsey set.
Proof. By Theorem 1 in Dubey and Mitra (2011) (a) holds if and
only if Y (<) is of order type µ. To prove equivalence, we need to
show (b) also holds if and only if Y (<) is of order type µ.
(b) If : Theorem 1. Only if : Lemma 3.
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Appendix
Proof (of Claim 1). Let N ≡ {n1 , n2 , . . .} with n1 < n2 < · · · be
the infinite subset of N, for which the inequality xnk > 0 > ynk
holds, for all k ∈ N. There are two cases.
Case (a). n1 = 1. Then x1 = 1 > −1 = y1 and xn > yn for all
n > 1. In this case, we take ⟨xn (π )⟩ = ⟨xn ⟩.
Case (b). n1 > 1. Then xk ⩾ yk + 1, for all k ⩾ n1 and xk = yk ,
for all k < n1 . Let n1 , . . . , nn1 −1 be the (n1 −1) smallest elements of
N. Define ⟨xn (π )⟩ to be the utility stream obtained by interchanging the kth entry of x with the nk th entry of x for k < n1 and leaving all other entries unchanged. For k < n1 , if xk = yk < 0, then
xk (π) = xnk > 0 > yk and xnk (π ) = xk = yk > ynk , and if
xk = yk > 0, then xk (π ) = xnk ⩾ xk + 1 > yk and xnk (π ) = xk >
0 > ynk . Hence, for all n ∈ N, xn (π ) > yn .
Therefore, x(π ) ≫ y in both cases. 
Proof (of Claim 2). The proof consists of two steps. First we show
that there exists a finite permutation ⟨xn (µ′ )⟩ of ⟨xn ⟩ such that
xn (µ′ ) ⩾ yn for all n ∈ N and xn (µ′ ) > 0 > yn for infinitely
many n ∈ N. Then we use Claim 1 to prove existence of a finite
permutation ⟨xn (µ)⟩ of ⟨xn (µ′ )⟩ such that x(µ) ≫ y. The desired
permutation would be π ≡ (µ) ◦ (µ′ ).
Step 1. Let m = max{n ∈ N : xn < 0 < yn }, which is finite.
Observe that first m elements of ⟨xn ⟩ has p (which can at most be m)
fewer positive elements compared to the first m elements of ⟨yn ⟩.
However, since there are infinitely many instances of xn > 0 > yn ,
it is possible to make up this shortfall by reaching further out in the
sequence to say m′ , such that there are p instances of xn > 0 > yn .
Then first m′ elements of ⟨xn ⟩ have same number of positive and
negative elements as the first m′ elements of ⟨yn ⟩. In other words,
they consist of elements which are identical subset of integers.
Hence permutation (µ′ ) is such that it transforms the first m′
elements of the sequence ⟨xn ⟩ to give the first m′ elements of ⟨yn ⟩
without changing any other element of ⟨xn ⟩.
Step 2. Observe that xn (µ′ ) ⩾ yn for all n ∈ N and there remain
infinitely many n > m′ for which xn (µ′ ) > 0 > yn holds. Denote
⟨xn (µ′ )⟩ by ⟨zn ⟩. By Claim 1, there exists a finite permutation µ
such that zn (µ) > yn for all n ∈ N. We take π = (µ) ◦ (µ′ )
which permutes only finitely many elements of ⟨xn ⟩ to complete
the proof. 

Proof (of Lemma 1). Let the SWO satisfy weak Pareto and anonymity axioms. We claim that for all infinite subsequences N of N,
set P ≡ {N |x(N ) ≺ y(N )} is a non-Ramsey set. We need to show
that for each infinite sequence T = {t1 , t2 , . . .} of N, denoting
the collection of infinite subsequences of T by T , there exists an
element S ∈ T such that either T ∈ P or S ∈ P with the
either, or being exclusive. As the binary relation is complete, either
x(T ) ≺ y(T ) or x(T ) ≻ y(T ) or x(T ) ∼ y(T ) must hold.
Case (a). Let x(T ) ≺ y(T ) or T ∈ P . We drop t1 and t4n+1 , t4n+2
for all n ∈ N from T to obtain S = {t2 , t3 , t4 , t7 , t8 , t11 , . . .}. Hence
S ∈ T . Denote the set of coordinates {t4n+1 , . . . , t4n+2 − 1 : n ∈ N}
by T̂ .
Observe that for all t ∈ T̂ , xt (S ) > 0 > yt (T ); xt (T ) > 0 >
yt (S ), and there are infinitely many coordinates in T̂ . Further,
xt (T ) > yt (S ) ∀t ⩾ t1 , xt (T ) = yt (S ) ∀t < t1 and xt (S ) > yt (T )
∀t ⩾ t5 , xt (S ) = yt (T ) ∀t < t5 .
Then using Claim 1 there exist finite permutations π and µ such
that ⟨x(T )⟩ ≫ ⟨y(π )(S )⟩ and ⟨x(µ)(S )⟩ ≫ ⟨y(T )⟩. Then y(π )(S ) ≺
x(T ) and x(µ)(S ) ≻ y(T ) by weak Pareto; and y(π )(S ) ∼ y(S ) and
x(µ)(S ) ∼ x(S ) by anonymity axiom. Since x(T ) ≺ y(T ), we get
y(S ) ∼ y(π )(S ) ≺ x(T ) ≺ y(T ) ≺ x(µ)(S ) ∼ x(S ) ⇒ S ̸∈ P .
Case (b). Let x(T ) ≻ y(T ). So T ̸∈ P . We drop t1 and t4n , t4n+1 for
all n ∈ N from T to obtain S = {t2 , t3 , t6 , t7 , t10 , t11 , . . .}. Hence S ∈
T . Denote the set of coordinates {t4n , . . . , t4n+1 − 1 : n ∈ N} by T̂ .
Observe that for all t ∈ T̂ , yt (S ) > 0 > xt (T ); yt (T ) > 0 >
xt (S ), and there are infinitely many such coordinates. Further,
yt (T ) > xt (S ) ∀t ⩾ t4 and yt (T ) = xt (S ) ∀t < t4 . Hence by
Claim 1, there exist a finite permutation π such that ⟨y(π )(T )⟩ ≫
⟨x(S )⟩.
Also (i) for t ∈ {t1 , . . . , t2 − 1}, yt (S ) < 0 < xt (T ); (ii) for all
coordinates t ∈ T̂ , yt (S ) > 0 > xt (T ); and (iii) for all the remain
ing elements (i.e., for t ∈ N \ {T̂ {t1 , . . . , t2 − 1}}) both yt (S )
and xt (T ) have same sign. Hence by Claim 2, there exists a finite
permutation µ such that ⟨y(µ)(S )⟩ ≫ ⟨x(T )⟩.
Then y(π )(T ) ≻ x(S ) and y(µ)(S ) ≻ x(T ) by weak Pareto
and y(π )(T ) ∼ y(T ); y(µ)(S ) ∼ y(S ) by anonymity axiom. Since
x(T ) ≻ y(T ),
y(S ) ∼ y(µ)(S ) ≻ x(T ) ≻ y(T ) ∼ y(π )(T ) ≻ x(S ) ⇒ S ∈ P .
Case (c). Let x(T ) ∼ y(T ) or T ̸∈ P . We drop t2 , t3 and
t4n+2 , t4n+3 for all n ∈ N from T to obtain S = {t1 , t4 , t5 , t8 , t9 , . . .}.
Hence S ∈ T . Denote the set of coordinates {t2 , . . . , t3 − 1} ∪
{t4n+2 , . . . , t4n+3 − 1 : n ∈ N} by T̂ as before.
Observe that for all t ∈ T̂ , xt (S ) > 0 > xt (T ) and yt (T ) > 0 >
yt (S ) and there are infinitely many coordinates in T̂ . Further, for all
coordinates t ⩾ t2 , xt (S ) > xt (T ), and yt (T ) > yt (S ) and for all
coordinates t < t2 , xt (S ) = xt (T ), and yt (T ) = yt (S ).
Hence by Claim 1, there exist finite permutations π and µ such
that ⟨x(π )(S )⟩ ≫ ⟨x(T )⟩ and ⟨y(T )⟩ ≫ ⟨y(µ)(S )⟩. Then x(π )(S ) ≻
x(T ); and y(µ)(S ) ≺ y(T ) by weak Pareto and x(π )(S ) ∼ x(S );
y(µ)(S ) ∼ y(S ) by anonymity axiom. Since x(T ) ∼ y(T ), we get
y(S ) ∼ y(µ)(S ) ≺ y(T ) ∼ x(T ) ≺ x(π )(S ) ∼ x(S ).
We use result in (Case (b)) to get S̄ ∈ S ⊂ T such that
y(S̄ ) ≻ x(S ) ≻ x(T ) ∼ y(T ) ≻ y(S ) ≻ x(S̄ ),
where S is the collection of infinite subsequences of S. Hence
S̄ ∈ P . 
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